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Botnet fingerprinting method based on anomaly detection in SMTP 
conversations 
 
Abstract: The paper presents the results obtained during 
research on detection of unsolicited e-mails which are sent by 
botnets. The distinction from most of the existing solutions is 
the fact that the presented approach is based on the analysis of 
network traffic – the sequence and syntax of SMTP commands 
observed during email delivery process. The paper presents 
several improvements for detection of unsolicited email 
sources from different botnets (fingerprinting), which can be 
used during network forensic investigation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The system of electronic mail is essential for 
business communication and most of the organizations 
cannot imagine working or even existing without e-mail 
accounts. On the other hand, it is also used for malicious 
activities. Just sending the advertising emails, besides 
being inconvenient and wasting various types of 
resources, e.g. available bandwidth (more than half of 
the email messages are classified as spam [1]) or disk 
space, carries a small risk of a security violation. Spam is 
commonly used during phishing campaigns and can 
include links to malicious websites or malicious 
attachments.  
Classical approach to e-mail forensic investigation 
[2] assumes analysis of electronic message headers and 
contents to identify the sender. The direct source of spam 
usually turns out to be misconfigured/compromised mail 
servers or specially prepared brokers (proxies), known as 
open relays which allow uncontrolled sending of 
electronic messages. Such sources of threats can be 
trivially filtered using blacklists.  
This in turn resulted in the development of 
advanced spambots - malicious programs specialized in 
sending spam using their own implementation or 
existing libraries containing SMTP (Simple Mail 
Transport Protocol - standard protocol used to send e-
mail) client functionality. However, the modular 
structure of modern bots allows the same infected 
machines to perform other malicious activities (DDoS, 
bitcoin mining etc.) [3, 4]. 
Figure 1 illustrates the two main modes of spambot 
operation. In the first mode (Fig. 1A), an infected 
computer sends spam via the aforementioned brokers. 
Thereby, it is restricting the number of locations from 
which unwanted messages reach the target e-mail 
servers. In the second case (Fig. 1B), where bots are able 
to use specific conversation with mail servers, the 
number of spam sources dramatically increases, up to the 
number of compromised machines controlled by the 
botmaster. Mail servers receive messages from a huge 
number of sources. Filtration is no longer trivial, source 
e-mail address, domain or IP address of the sender are 
not enough. 
A large number of scientific papers describing 
methods of spam detection have been published [5, 6]. 
These are mainly based on the analysis of the received 
message - its headers, content and attachments. For this 
purpose statistical methods [7], graph theory [8] and 
even machine learning algorithms [9,] are used. 
Noteworthy are the papers of Stringhini et al. ([10] and 
its follow-up [11]), which present quite a different 
approach. Authors focus on the analysis of network 
communication observed during the sending of a 
message by a spambot, while creating a profile of so-
called SMTP dialects and comparing them with normal 
traffic generated by benign mail sending applications. 
Their results show mistakes in the implementation of the 
SMTP protocol made by the malware authors and 
therefore possibility of its classification. Detection of 
anomalies in SMTP traffic may find application in the 
network forensic investigation on malicious activity of 
Fig. 1. Spambot email delivery with brokers (A) and 
direct (B) 
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spambots [12]. Paper [13] presents in-depth analysis of 
spam detection through network characteristics, like IP 
TTL derived from TCP SYN packet or completion time 
of TCP three way handshake. 
In this paper, we focus on the development of the 
algorithm of detection and classification of messages 
sent by spambots. The article presents additional features 
(section 3) and results (both spam detection and botnet 
fingerprinting) that we have obtained during our work on 
the analysis of unsolicited emails (section 4). The main 
part of the article is preceded by a short description of 
the structure of an SMTP conversation and a definition 
of an SMTP dialect (section 2). The paper finishes with a 
brief conclusion of our findings (section 5). 
 
2. SMTP Dialects 
In order to understand the idea of SMTP dialects 
analysis, some basics have to be established.  
SMTP is a global standard for email transfer. This 
text-based protocol was defined in 1982 and updated in 
2008 by RFC 5321. In simple words, it can be described 
as the rules of conversation between MUA (Mail User 
Agent, e.g. Microsoft Outlook, Mozilla Thunderbird) 
clients and MTA/MDA servers (Mail Transfer Agent, 
Mail Delivery Agent, e.g. Postfix or Microsoft Exchange 
Server), which should result in electronic mail delivery.  
Generalized mail delivery is presented in fig. 2  and  
the procedure is performed in a following way:  
• 1) user provides an input (message and 
recipients) to the MUA which transfers mail to 
the mail server using the SMTP protocol, 
• 2a) if server is used as a relay, the MTA  
forwards the message to the appropriate mail 
server using SMTP, 
• 2b) if the current MTA is the final destination 
of the message, mail delivery to the local 
mailbox is handled by the server's MDA (Mail 
Delivery Agent), 
• 3) mail is downloaded from the proper mailbox 
by the MUA using POP (Post Office Protocol) 
or IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) 
protocols. 
Fig. 2. Direct and indirect email delivery. 
SMTP conversation is carried out according to the 
client-server model and looks the same, whether 
message delivery is performed between the MUA and 
the MTA or two different MTA's. The following listing 
shows a typical SMTP conversation, where an email is 
sent to one recipient.  
S: 220 smtp.server.com 
C: EHLO my.example.com 
S: 250 smtp.server.com 
C: MAIL FROM:<sender@example.com> 
S: 250 2.1.0 Ok 
C: RCPT TO:<recipient@server.com> 
S: 250 2.1.5 Ok 
C: DATA 
S: 354 
C: Test message. 
C: . 
S: 250 2.0.0 Ok 
C: QUIT 
S: 221 2.0.0 Bye 
When TCP connection is successfully established, 
the server greets the client (with “220” command).  
The client responds using the “EHLO” command 
(or “HELO” in a deprecated version of SMTP). Then, 
the sender of the email is provided using “MAIL 
FROM” command. If the sender address is accepted by 
the server, the recipient address is provided using 
“RCPT TO”. Finally, the client signalizes beginning of 
the message through the “DATA” command and ends it 
using a special terminator (dot). The transmitted message 
should conform to the IMF (Internet Message Format) 
standard. Conversation ends with the “QUIT” command 
and the server response. 
In this simple scenario, only five from eleven 
primary SMTP client commands are used. Every SMTP 
command must end with <CR><LF> (carriage return + 
line feed) line terminator.  
Extended SMTP allows the client to use available 
SMTP extensions, listed by the server after successful 
“EHLO”. For example, the client may receive 
information whether encrypted connections initialized by 
“STARTTLS” command are supported. 
Like in a spoken language, there are rules that have 
to be obeyed in order for an SMTP conversation to be 
understood by both sides, but some minor grammatical 
differences or errors have no real impact on the 
conversation outcome.  
If for example, the MTA recognizes both “MAIL 
FROM:<me@example.com>” and “mail from: 
me@example.com" commands properly and can 
distinguish the address correctly. SMTP commands are 
case-insensitive, and some characters like “<>” or some 
whitespaces are optional. Various equivalent forms of 
SMTP commands lead to the possibility of 
distinguishing different SMTP implementations and their 
sources. 
As mentioned in the introduction section, first work 
towards analysis of different SMTP protocol 
implementations was presented by G. Stringhini et. al. 
[10]. Authors provided the solution called “B@bel”, in 
which SMTP dialects derived from incoming TCP 
sessions are analyzed and compared with the known 
(benign) SMTP dialects.  In later research [12], G. 
Stringhini et. al. used primary IMF fields like message 
subject or sender address to connect SMTP dialects with 
spam campaigns.  
3. SMTP Dialect Extension 
As our solution is based on the concept presented in 
[10, 11], we propose the following improvements to the 
already developed SMTP dialects fingerprinting: 
• analysis of full SMTP conversation (“B@bel" 
system was limited to the investigation until 
“DATA” command), 
• analysis of SMTP extensions syntax, 
• analysis of IMF fields strictly linked with 
dialects, i.e.: “User-Agent”  containing 
information about MUA or   “Received” 
containing information about email travel path, 
• dialect classification in three categories: benign, 
suspicious and malicious. 
Next chapters describe  the aforementioned 
enhancements. 
 
3.1. Parsing Full Conversation and 
Extensions 
While previous solutions assumed that the “DATA” 
expression is the last final state in every dialect and it is 
not necessary to parse further commands, we have 
decided to extend analysis to full SMTP conversation.  
This can be relevant, as there may be inconsistencies in 
e.g. “QUIT” commands. One of the most surprising 
behaviors is a special usage of the “RSET” command 
after sending an email to send more emails during the 
same TCP session (even 10 000 emails in a single TCP 
connection were observed). In addition, we have 
provided a possibility to check the syntax of SMTP 
extensions described in RFC 5321. 
 
In summary, we have developed three different 
operation modes for our SMTP dialects analyzer: 
• method 0 (M0): parse conversation until the 
“DATA” command, like “B@bel” for reference 
purpose, 
• method 1 (M1): parse the whole conversation 
without SMTP extensions, 
• method 2 (M2): parse the whole conversation 
with SMTP extensions. 
 
3.2. IMF Extension  
As mentioned before, IMF is a standard syntax for 
electronic mail messages. Its header consists of different 
fields e.g.: “From”, “To”, “Subject” or “CC”. We 
believe that several IMF fields may be successfully used 
in dialect analysis and botnet fingerprinting. 
The first field included in analysis is responsible for 
informing the MTA about the MUA client type and 
version. Although this field is optional, it is a good 
practice to provide one. There are several names for this 
field in common use, though the most popular are 
probably “User-Agent” and “X-Mailer”. Our classifier 
compares the actual SMTP dialect with the client 
specified in IMF. For example, we have obtained  email 
messages whose dialects match a legitimate MUA – 
Mozilla Thunderbird. However, the analysis of the IMF 
header showed that an “User-Agent” field was not even 
specified or specified like in another MUA e.g. Outlook 
2010. On this basis, we can treat these messages as 
suspicious because of the inconsistency in dialect. The 
same reasoning can be applied to MTA dialects. 
Another information used in our research included 
the IMF “Received” trace field. It is supposed to inform 
the current MTA about the real route of an email. If the 
email is received by an MTA for delivery to another 
server, it has to insert a trace in the form of a “Received” 
field. In case of direct email delivery, there should not be 
any “Received” trace in IMF. According to this, we are 
able to determine whether the message is originating 
from an MTA or a MUA. 
For example, a message with a dialect matching 
only a legitimate MUA (direct delivery), may state in the 
IMF that the email was forwarded by an MTA. This can 
be treated as an attempt of spoofing (client pretending to 
be a server) and should mark the source of message as 
suspicious. This relation can be reversed (and indeed 
such attempts were observed), with the server claiming 
to be a client. 
 
3.3. Classifier 
Our prototype solution was implemented in Python 
2.7 and based on a prepared knowledge database. We 
have classified senders of emails in three categories:  
• benign – known MUA and MTA; during 
selection of clients, we have taken into account 
the email client market statistics [14]. 
According to the data from January 1st - 
February 1st 2017 our selection of clients covers 
more than 90% of current email traffic, 
• suspicious – known SMTP client 
implementations on different platforms in 
different programming languages, 
• malicious – malicious dialects are collected 
from three main sources: real bots traffic 
samples provided by CERT Polska, real bots 
traffic from “Malware Capture Facility Project” 
and manual analysis of traffic received by a 
real-operating spamtrap. 
Table 1. Analyzed benign and suspicious  MUAs and MTAs 
together with bot samples 
In our solution, we used SMTP command patterns and 
regular expressions in order to retrieve general states of 
SMTP dialects (Table 2.). Our regular expressions 
include detection of parameters like domains, email 
addresses, IP addresses and many others. If a word 
included in the SMTP command is recognized by neither 
regular expressions nor command patterns, it is written 
in our syntax as “text”. Unlike our predecessors, we do 
not create state machines of dialects. Instead, we are 
obtaining hashes of an ordered list of obtained states. 
Classification itself is based on hashes comparison and 
rules checking (IMF extensions). 
 
Table 2. Exemplary conversion of SMTP commands into 
dialect states. 
4. The Results 
All presented information was obtained using our 
testing infrastructure, which is presented in Fig. 3. The 
spamtrap is responsible for capturing spam from various 
sources. While we capture incoming network traffic on a 
network device, the spamtrap derives session keys (pre-
master secrets) from encrypted TCP streams. Tshark 
software is used for data decryption and separation of 
different TCP streams. Parsing and classification 
software based on the data collected in the knowledge 
base saves its results in the storage. During system 
operation the administrator can decide whether to add 
one of the unknown dialects to the knowledge database 
(this operation can be performed later, after further 
analysis). 
Fig. 3. Testing Environment 
 
4.1. Knowledge database 
The knowledge database is composed of dialects 
derived from clients and real bot samples included in 
Table 1 and dialects coming from network traffic 
incoming to our spamtrap. Table 3 presents the number 
of benign, suspicious and malicious dialects 
distinguished by different operation modes. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Number of distinguished dialects for every mode 
In accordance with the assumption, the more complex 
our analysis is, the more dialects we can distinguish. M2 
recognizes more than twice as many dialects as M0. 
Many differences in benign or suspicious clients occur 
after the “DATA” command, as the big difference 
between the number of benign dialects for M0 and 
M1/M2 shows.  
In every operation mode, the number of command 
variants significantly increases the number of known 
dialects. It indicates that there are a lot of mistakes / 
inaccuracies in botnets' SMTP implementations. 
However, the vast majority of malicious classifications 
comes from the first part of SMTP conversation, e.g. the 
“MAIL FROM” command has four benign variants, 
whereas up to twelve malicious variants were 
distinguished, depending on the method. Additionally, 
we have discovered several unknown client commands, 
which are improper according to the SMTP standard, 
e.g.“220 domain ESMTP Welcome” – an attempt of a 
client at sending server commands. 
 
4.2. Result Statistic 
 Our data set consists of 32470 conversations, from 
which 13017 are scans on port 25 and others are 
conversations finished with a successful email transfer. It 
should be noted that every single obtained conversation 
in reality originated from a malicious source. As the 
spamtrap is not used for regular email transfer, the only 
messages incoming are SPAM. According to this, we 
can obtain only two classifications: TP (True Positive) 
when spam is detected correctly and FN (False Negative) 
if not. However, spam FP (False Positive) and TN (True 
Negative) rates are not really relevant from the botnet 
fingerprinting perspective, as we are focused only on 
dialects and IMF matching. 
This chapter presents simple numerical results for 
all streams from the validation set. We have divided the 
obtained results into three different categories (table 4): 
• “UNKNOWN” denotes conversations in which 
every SMTP command is known from 
legitimate MUAs and MTAs, although the 
command sequence is unknown (not correctly 
matched with any dialects from the database), 
thus we are not able to categorize it, 
• “MALICIOUS” denotes malicious 
conversations which were collected from 
manual analysis of spambots' traffic, traffic 
classified as originating from malicious 
activities and real bot samples, 
• “KNOWN” denotes conversations which are 
correctly matched with the database of 
legitimate dialects. 
Additionally, we have used four metrics: 
• Number of samples – the number of 
conversations matching the current category, 
• Ratio of total - ratio of matched samples and all 
captured SMTP conversations, 
• IMF inconsistency – number of alerts triggered 
for conversations matching current category, 
• Ratio of alerts – ratio of alerts triggered and 
number of all categorized conversations. 
Alerts are triggered if there is an inconsistency 
between the dialect and the IMF header fields, described 
in chapter 3.2 (spoofing MUA client type or incorrectly 
matched email trace fields with MUA/MTA). Samples 
which triggered an alert should be treated as malicious.  
In table 4, three different operation modes 
described in chapter 3.1 are compared. As almost 62% of 
incoming SMTP traffic does not match any legitimate 
dialect, it can be immediately treated as originating from 
malicious sources while using our M1 and M2 
operations mode (table 4 classification part). On the 
other hand, M0 based on the solution [10] is able to 
classify about 59% of traffic as malicious.  
If we treat inconsistency between the dialects and 
the IMF headers as at least suspicious, it turns out that 
the number of False Negatives can be significantly 
reduced. Analysis of the results shows that our proposed 
IMF based extension has greatly improved classification 
results with a 18.6%, 33,4% and 19.5% True Positive 
enhancement for M1, M2 and M0 respectively. M2 
connected with IMF analysis reached an impressive 95 
% TP rate. In case of M1 and M0 known dialects, all 
alerts were trigged by incorrectly specified “X-Mailer” 
or “User-Agent” IMF fields. In case of M2, 4832 alerts 
were triggered by the wrong mailer fields, while 1675 
alerts were triggered by client/server spoofing (analysis 
of “Received” IMF field). 
 
Table 4. Comparison of results in different operation modes 
Solution based on SMTP dialects analysis clearly 
provides good results. However, there are many 
legitimate MUAs and it is almost impossible to collect 
every benign dialect. That can lead to the improper 
classification of a legitimate message as spam (False 
Positive). This is not a concern when analysis is focused   
exclusively on botnet fingerprinting. In order to avoid a 
growing number of False Positives, the database should 
be constantly updated. Nonetheless, we have provided 
the IMF extension which is able to detect attempts of 
spoofing. About 60% of obtained conversations with 
unknown / malicious dialects were pretending to be a 
different MUA than they were in reality (mostly 
pretending to be an Apple device or Microsoft Outlook). 
Our database of legitimate dialects included clients, 
which according to the statistics correspond to more than 
90% of email traffic (on the basis of 1.25 billion 
messages) [14]. 
 
4.3 Botnet fingerprinting 
Botnet fingerprinting can be performed by matching of 
bot dialects and IMF fields with dialects derived from 
network traffic incoming to the SMTP server. In around 
19500 successful SMTP conversations, following 
botnets were fingerprinted in M1 mode: 
 
• Vawtrak: 3872 messages from 2 IP addr., 
• Kelihos: 2816 messages from 627 IP addr., 
• Htbot: 879 messages from 669 IP addr., 
• Zbot: 1 message from 1 IP addr. 
 
Although we have limited access to real bot samples, 
almost 40% of traffic was successfully assigned to 
botnets. Moreover, TCP/IP headers analysis [13] can be 
additionally performed, in order to increase accuracy of 
fingerprinting, as implementations of SMTP in some 
bots may be similar to the legit SMTP dialects. 
 
4.4 Interesting cases 
Some selected cases of unusual mistakes in SMTP 
implementations will now be presented.  
First example concerns the bot responsible for a 
malicious eFax spam campaign [15]. In the IMF header, 
the bot sample signalized usage of four MUAs 
(depending on the message): Apple Mail, iPhone Mail, 
iPad Mail, iPod Mail. However, the bot SMTP dialect 
differs from real dialects derived from the Apple 
devices: 
• the malicious dialect greets with “HELO 
domain”, the benign dialect greets with “EHLO 
[IP]”, 
• only the malicious dialect inserts space 
character between “:” and “<” characters in 
“MAIL FROM” and “RCPT TO” commands,  
• only the benign dialect uses the “QUIT” 
command. 
Second example presents a big, although hard to 
notice mistake. In this dialect, line terminators are <LF> 
instead of <CR><LF>. Such an implementation is 
incompatible with SMTP standard RFC 5321, and can 
lead to problems in communication between different 
MUAs and MTAs. However, the Postfix MTA can 
process commands with line feed terminators, so spam 
can be propagated without hindrance.  
Next example describes an almost successful 
implementation of a benign-looking SMTP dialect with 
just one seemingly negligible error. The malicious client 
responsible for spam propagation finishes the 
conversation using a command parsed as “QUIT space 
<CR><LF>” – inserting a space character between the 
command and line terminator characters. This is an 
unusual behavior, not present in any analyzed benign 
dialect. Moreover, no other commands include this space 
character. It is probably an outcome of a typo, thus 
allows to doubt in authenticity of email message source.  
Additionally, using the described methodology of 
SMTP dialect analysis, it is possible to fingerprint 
bots/systems responsible for scanning SMTP ports. 
Moreover, we observed that bots are checking if 
particular security mechanisms are handled by the SMTP 
server, like starting TLS connection with “STARTTLS” 
command or user authentication. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The paper discusses an important section of digital 
forensics – botnet fingerprinting. Our work is an 
overview and considerable extension of the method 
proposed in [10], based on an analysis of the SMTP 
implementations in clients / bots. Our extensions and 
methods were validated on the network traffic incoming 
to the real-operating spamtrap. In addition, we had 
access to the real bot samples. 
We have proven that it is beneficial to extend the 
network traffic analysis to the full SMTP conversation. 
Two additional analyses based on proper interpretation 
of chosen IMF fields have led to a significant decrease of 
False Negative classifications (from around 40% to even 
5%). Additionally, the IMF header analysis can also 
decrease the number of skipped samples (unknown 
dialects) and classify them as malicious when an attempt 
of spoofing is detected. 
Having access to 7 SMTP dialects derived from 
real bots, our method was able to fingerprint 4 different 
botnets in 19500 spam messages. Three other bot 
dialects were not spotted in the spamtrap traffic. 
Spam detection methods are usually paired with 
each other and classification is rarely performed on the 
basis of a single solution. It seems especially attractive to 
connect our method with the others based on the analysis 
of the message contents, as it will provide the symbiosis 
of effective spam detection methods. However, our 
future research will be focused on matching malicious 
dialects and sources with particular spam campaigns. 
This may be important in fingerprinting not only single 
bots, but the whole botnets.  
In summary, we have proposed several 
improvements to the idea of botnet fingerprinting and 
spam detection achieved by analysis of SMTP 
implementation. Our results show high accuracy of the 
aforementioned methods and presented extensions. 
Initial tests and research proved that our solution can be 
successfully used in both botnet fingerprinting and spam 
detection. 
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